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Chapter 32 
The social psychology of discrimination 
Jules Holroyd, University of Sheffield 
Word count: 
 
Abstract 
How, if at all, do the findings of social psychology impact upon philosophical analyses of 
discrimination? In this chapter, I outline key findings from three research programs from 
psychology ± concerning in-group/out-group favoritism; implicit bias; and stereotype threat. I argue 
that each set of findings presents challenges to how philosophical analyses of group discrimination 
are formulated, and propose possible revisions to be explored in future work. 
 
1. Introduction 
Research in social psychology focuses on the psychological mechanisms involved in and 
underpinning discrimination. The research program is vast (for accessible overviews, see Ramiah et 
al 2010, for research on gender discrimination in particular see Valian 1999, on racial 
discrimination see Blank et al 2004). In this chapter I focus on three areas of research from social 
psychology that have been taken up by philosophers: in-group/out-group favoritism; implicit bias; 
and stereotype threat. Whilst each has garnered some philosophical attention, little attempt has been 
made to tease out the implications of this research for philosophical analyses of discrimination. In 
this chapter I explore the some of the ways in which insights from research from social psychology 
may require revision or fine-tuning to philosophical analyses of discrimination. Philosophers have 
good reason to attend to the findings of social psychology: not only to gain an understanding of the 
mechanisms that may underpin discrimination; but also to inform philosophical analyses of 
discrimination and ensure they are suitably formulated to capture the full range of the phenomena.  
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2. Discrimination 
In order to evaluate the implications of this research for analyses of discrimination, it will help to 
have an understanding of discrimination in view. For present purposes, we will focus on the 
analysis offered by Lippert-Rasmussen (2013), which has been recently elaborated and defended. 
The conditions are intended to capture the notion of group discrimination, which is arguably at 
issue in common usage of the notion of discrimination. Lippert-Rasmussen proposes the following 
set of conditions for group (direct) discrimination: 
 
An agent, X, discriminates against someone, Y, in relation to another, Z, by ĭ-ing (e.g. 
hiring Z rather than Y) if and only if: 
 i) There is a property, P, such that Y has P or X believes that Y has P, and Z does not have P 
or X believes that Z does not have P, 
 ii) X treats Y worse than he treats or would treat Z by ĭ-ing, and 
 iii) It is because (X believes that) Y has P and (X believes that) Z does not have P that X 
treats Y worse than Z by ĭ-ing (15) 
 iv'') P is the property of being a member of a certain socially salient group (to which Z does 
not belong) (26) 
v) ĭ is a relevant type of act, policy or practice, and there are many acts etc. of this type, and 
this fact makes people with P (or some subgroup of these people) worse off relative to 
others, or ĭ is a relevant type of act etc., and many acts etc. of this type would make people 
with P worse off relative to others, or X's ĭ-ing is motivated by animosity towards or dislike 
of individuals with P or by the belief that individuals who have P are inferior or ought not to 
intermingle with others (2013: 28) 
 
Lippert-Rasmussen clarifies that conditions i-iii are part of an analysis of generic discrimination 
(15-22) - a broad notion of discrimination that captures differential treatment of persons such as 
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exclusion of unqualified candidates from consideration for a job, or judicial conviction of 
individuals found to be guilty (15). The addition of conditions iv'') and v) narrows down the 
analysis to one that captures those cases in which individuals are differentially treated on the basis 
of membership of socially salient group, where social salience is a matter of perceived membership 
being important to the structure of social interactions in a range of social contexts (e.g. race, gender, 
age) (30). This idea is accommodated by condition LY´ Finally, condition v) of Lippert-
5DVPXVVHQ¶V analysis is needed in order to give an analysis that excludes one-shot, 
unproblematically motivated differential treatment that does not, or would not, constitute a pattern 
of disadvantaging treatment (28-30). Accordingly, condition v) captures the idea that it is 
differential treatment which involves actions, or patterns of action, that do or would disadvantage, 
or which express hostility or judgments of inferiority, with which we are concerned.1  
 We should note that it is this idea of group discrimination with which much research in 
social psychology has been concerned: the driving motivation behind much of the social 
psychological research is to understand discrimination and the mechanisms underpinning it as it 
tracks and structures our social identities. Ramiah et al (2010) motivate their field of research by 
observing that µWKH pervasiveness of discrimination and its systematic, and often subtle, expression 
shapes society in ways that perpetuate LQHTXLWLHV¶ (90). This much indicates that at stake for these 
authors is discrimination that tracks social identities taken to be important and with significance for 
the ways in which society is structured. 
 Note, moreover, that our focus for the most part in this paper is on direct discrimination: 
cases in which an individual (or organization) treats another person or group disadvantageously, 
because of their social group membership (race, age, gender and so on). This is because much of the 
psychological research is relevant to direct discrimination, since it speaks to the cognitive 
mechanisms underpinning differential treatment in this sense. I set aside, for the most part, the 
important related phenomenon of indirect discrimination, which concerns cases where a policy or 
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procedure is on the face of it neutral, but in fact disproportionately disadvantages members of a 
particular social group. 
 With this analysis on the table, and a sense of its relationship to the concerns of social 
psychological research, we can examine some of the research programs which focus on the 
cognitive mechanisms that underpin discriminatory judgments and behavior. We will then be in a 
position to consider what revisions or refinements, if any, this understanding of group 
discrimination may benefit from. 
 
3. Discrimination involving In-group favoritism 
Social psychologists have identified in-group favoritism as one of the mechanisms by which 
differential treatment is perpetrated. So called µFDWHJRULzation HIIHFWV¶ - whether individuals are 
categorized as µLQ-JURXS¶ or µRXW-JURXS¶ members - have been shown to impact on a wide array of 
behaviors, from what is credited to the an agent, to the sorts of benefits allocated to her.  
 For example, various studies have prompted individuals to consider whether behaviors or 
outcomes, which may have been positive or negative, were the result of an DJHQW¶V traits (e.g. her 
hard work or talents), or due to factors external to the agent (such as luck or other peoSOH¶V actions). 
These studies have focused on different in-group/out-group identities, with Hindu participants being 
asked to evaluate the described behaviors of Hindu (in-group) or Muslim (out-group) individuals 
(Taylor & Jaggi 1974); Israeli and Arab American students being asked to evaluate actions from 
other Israeli and Arab agents (Rosenberg & Wolfsfeld 1977); and even individuals with preferences 
for Super Bowl teams (Dallas Cowboys vs Pittsburgh Steelers) being asked to evaluate the causes 
of events involving their respective teams in a game (Winkler & Taylor 1979).  
 In these studies, the findings indicated that when individuals evaluated out-group members, 
negative behaviors or outcomes were more frequently attributed to failings on the part of the out-
group agent (bad character, lack of effort, and so on). Meanwhile, positive outcomes were 
explained by situational factors, thereby removing credit from the out-group individual. The 
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converse pattern was found when participants made evaluations of in-group members: positive 
outcomes were more frequently attributed to traits of the agent, whilst negative actions or outcomes 
were attributed to situational factors out of the DJHQW¶V control.2  
 In another study, participants viewed video recordings of behaviors (a µVKRYH¶ that could be 
interpreted in different ways. The responses analyzed showed that white participants attributed the 
behavior as due to personal factors, such as violent dispositions when the perpetrator was racialized 
black; and more frequently interpreted the same behavior as due to situational factors when the 
perpetrator was racialized white (Duncan 1976). In these studies, then, in-group favoritism 
manifests itself in the disposition to reach for explanatory resources that are favorable to members 
of our in-group. 
 A notable feature of this research paradigm, however, is that whilst in some of the studies 
above the in-group identities tracked social identities that are consequential in structuring social 
arrangements, and indeed are sometimes identities with which group members positively identify, 
the in-group bias need not depend on such social identities. In studies that asked participants to 
allocate rewards to in-group and out-group members, the group identities activated were entirely 
arbitrary, and artificially constructed by the experimental context: e.g. the tendency to over-estimate 
or under-estimate the number of dots presented in a prior task (Taifel & Turner 1986). Yet, even 
still, being a member of one or other of these groups sufficed to activate in-group bias: members of 
each group typically favored the allocation of resources to in-group members, and sought to 
maximize the difference in resources allocated to in-group and out-group members.3 Other studies 
focused on arbitrarily constructed group statuses that tracked the team color to which participants 
belonged (being assigned to the µJUHHQ¶ group, or the µUHG¶ group, say) (Dawes et al 1990). The key 
point to note, then, is that whilst the tendency to form such in-group preferences seems a pervasive 
feature of our psychology, the in-group/out-group statuses that this form of favoritism may track 
seems to be highly malleable. That is to say: who counts as in RQH¶V in-group may be variable, with 
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new (sometimes arbitrary) group statuses being formed depending on social contextual features or 
prompts.  
 Note that analyses of discrimination have characterized group discrimination such that these 
sorts of arbitrary in-group preferences would not meet the criteria for social salience. For example, 
the notion of social salience incorporated by Lippert-Rasmussen has it that: 
 
A group is socially salient if perceived membership of it is important to the structure of social 
interactions across a wide range of social contexts (2013: 30).4 
This analysis of social salience permits us to capture the notion of discrimination as it is used to 
explain what is wrong with certain kinds of treatment that disadvantage women, racial minorities, 
certain religious identities, or the elderly, for example. These kinds of social identities clearly 
structure social interactions and social hierarchies in a broad range of contexts. Note, though, that 
this analysis will not allow the sort of differential treatment manifested in some of the studies on in-
group favoritism to be diagnosed as discrimination. Certainly the disposition to over- or under-
estimate dots is not socially salient in this sense: it does not structure interactions across a wide 
range of social contexts. Yet it is precisely because the experimenters brought this status to salience 
- as structuring that social context - that we saw patterns of differential treatment emerge within the 
laboratory studies.  
 Moreover, the experimentally found tendency for in-group bias has been identified by 
philosophers as one of the mechanisms by which structures of hierarchy and inequality might be 
perpetuated. Consider Elizabeth $QGHUVRQ¶V remarks, in the context of epistemic discrimination, 
whereby some agents are judged to be less credible than others. She observes that if in-group biases 
in this context line up with social identities that are already the basis of systematic disadvantages, 
then we should see this sort of epistemic discrimination as structural (Anderson, 2012: 170). For 
example, if in-group bias about credibility judgments tracks race, then this will reinforce epistemic 
and other dimensions of disadvantage that black and minority ethnicity individuals may already 
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face. Compare this with a context in which in-group bias about credibility judgments track whether 
one is an over- or under-estimator of dots. This will not track any pre-existing systemic 
disadvantage. $QGHUVRQ¶V remarks alert us to the distinction between the identities that populate an 
in-group/out-group bias, and the social salience of those identities in structuring or perpetuating 
wider patterns of social disadvantage. 
 The point of this observation is to show that analyses of group discrimination that aim to 
focus on the socially salient identity have a choice to make about the scope of the phenomena to be 
captured. The choice made will have implications for how social salience is characterized. For 
example, on the one hand, we may seek to restrict discrimination to those cases that meet the social 
salience criteria as characterized above. One motivation for doing so is to capture ordinary usage of 
the notion of discrimination. This would be to maintain that differential treatment on the basis of 
these arbitrarily drawn and artificially constructed in-group identities is not discrimination. On this 
construal, dispositions to favor in-group members may be present across a range of differential 
treatments, but only some of those instances constitute group discrimination proper.  
 On the other hand, we might seek to treat the in-group biases revealed in various 
experimental contexts as continuous with the notion of discrimination as captured by the analysis 
offered in section 1. In that case, we could refine our analysis of social salience, indexing it to a 
context, such that: 
A group is socially salient, in context C, if perceived membership of it is important to the 
structure of social interactions in that context, C. 
On this construction, in-lab differential treatment such as that described above will count as 
discrimination, though this manifestly will not transmit to other contexts, in which other identities 
are salient. What may be socially salient for the purposes of an LQGLYLGXDO¶s differential treatment 
may not coincide with what is socially salient in structuring broader patterns of social disadvantage. 
 What attention to the social psychological research helps us to see, then, is that the original 
analysis of group discrimination builds in certain strong conditions for social salience, present only 
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in some of the cases of differential treatment; albeit those which garner great concern and feature in 
ordinary usage of the notion of discrimination. But this is just one option: a context sensitive 
account of salience may be preferred, if one seeks to capture all cases of differential treatment based 
on in-group bias, and identify the continuity, in terms of operative cognitive mechanism, between 
the µLQ ODE¶ and µUHDO ZRUOG¶ phenomena. 
 
4. Discrimination involving implicit bias 
In the past couple of decades, social psychologists have focused on the measurement of µLPSOLFLW 
ELDV¶ or what is sometimes called µDYHUVLYH UDFLVP¶ or unconscious or automatic discrimination. In 
this section I set out some of the research on implicit bias, and show how our understanding of 
discrimination ± in particular, condition iii of the analysis from earlier ± requires revision.  
Implicit biases are automatic patterns of thought or feeling.5 Notably, these patterns may not 
be transparent to us, and it may be difficult for us to detect and control when they are operating in 
our minds or influencing our judgments and behaviors. Those which have occupied the attention of 
philosophers typically involve attaching some negative property or stereotypic trait to membership 
of a social group. For example, indirect measures have indicated that men are more strongly 
associated with leadership and women more strongly associated with nurturing and supporting roles 
(AAUW report 2016).6 Other studies have found that white people are more strongly associated 
with intellectual features and black people more strongly associated with physical traits (Amodio & 
Devine 2006). Other measures have focused on the problematic biases we might have towards 
people on the basis of religion, age, disability, sexuality (see Jost et al 2009 for an overview of 
research on implicit biases). Crucially, individuals who sincerely profess egalitarian values and 
beliefs may display negative associations on these indirect measures. Whilst the mere presence of 
such biases is troubling, their potential to influence action is particularly relevant to concerns about 
discrimination. Various studies indicate that behavior may be influenced by implicit bias.7 Consider 
first a study on hiring selections by Dovidio & Gaertner (2000). These studies indicated that 
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individuals were more likely to make hiring recommendations in the case of moderately good white 
candidates than moderately good black candidates. (In cases where the candidates were obviously 
stellar or unqualified, the decisions tracked quality of application rather than race). The moderately 
good candidates had exactly the same credentials, but differed only with respect to the race 
indicated on their application materials (cued with racially stereotyped names). Accordingly, the 
differential recommendations appear to be race-based discrimination, and involve a pattern of 
treatment that would - does - significantly disadvantage black individuals. Yet individuals who 
made such discriminatory recommendations may not have been aware that they were 
discriminating, and indeed may avow anti-racist norms of fair treatment when asked to report on 
their explicit or endorsed beliefs and values. 
 Second, consider the now well known 'shooter bias' tests (Glaser et al 2006, Correll et al 
2007). In these studies, individuals participate in a simulation task whereby they are shown images 
of males in different postures holding a range of objects. In some cases the object is a weapon 
(gun); in other cases, it is not (mobile phone). Some of the images are of black males, others of 
white males. Participants in the simulation are instructed to 'shoot' at only those individuals who are 
armed. Results indicate that the participants more likely (and faster) to shoot black males with 
weapons than white males with weapons, and more likely to make the error of shooting an unarmed 
black male. It is clear how such biases and discriminatory behavior could have gravely 
disadvantaging effects for black individuals. 
 Cases such as these ± where individuals are discriminating based on race ± may not fit our 
usual understanding of discrimination: the discriminatory treatment may be unintentional. Indeed, 
that she is engaging in unequal treatment may be something of which the discriminator is unaware; 
and, were she cognizant of it, would disavow. Nonetheless, I take it as uncontroversial that such 
patterns of race-based differential treatment, that are obviously disadvantageous, do count as 
discrimination, and should be captured by an analysis of the notion.8 However, the conditions we 
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set out above need refinement if they are able to do so. Let us consider the first three conditions for 
group discrimination set out in section 2: 
 
An agent, X, discriminates against someone, Y, in relation to another, Z, by ĭ-ing (e.g. 
hiring Z rather than Y) if and only if: 
 i) There is a property, P, such that Y has P or X believes that Y has P, and Z does not have P 
or X believes that Z does not have P, 
 ii) X treats Y worse than he treats or would treat Z by ĭ-ing, and 
 iii) It is because (X believes that) Y has P and (X believes that) Z does not have P that X 
treats Y worse than Z by ĭ-ing 
 
Take the shooter bias studies. The discriminator (X) is in this case one of the participants in the 
study. The property in question, P, is the race of the individual in the scenario - P denotes the fact 
that an individual (Y) is racialized black (or believed to be black). In shooting an unarmed black 
male in the study images, X treats that individual worse than he treats other individuals in the study 
images who are not black, with potentially fatal consequences.9 Insofar as the race of the 
individuals in the images appears to be the only factor that could explain the differential responses, 
it appears that it is this perceived property (P) (possessed by Y but not by Z) which explains why X 
treats Y in that way. In our current context, race is a socially salient group, clearly; and the kind of 
action at issue - shooting - is such that it is of a relevant type of act of which there are many of this 
type which makes black individuals worse off (facing increased risk of violence in their daily 
lives).10 The point I want to press is that some refinement is needed to the analysis of direct 
discrimination if it is to be able to adequately capture this sort of discriminatory behavior. The 
adequacy of the analysis turns on the way in which the third condition is understood. Recall this 
condition requires that: 
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iii) It is because (X believes that) Y has P and (X believes that) Z does not have P that X 
treats Y worse than Z by ĭ-ing 
 
We should want to say that it is because (the discriminator ± the participant in the test ± believes 
that) the individual is black - and (the discriminator believes that) other individuals in the 
simulation images are white - that the discriminator treats the black individuals worse (shooting 
more readily, including at unarmed individuals) than the white individuals.  
 However, we need to see further what it means to say that someone acted because the 
individual has (or is believed to have) the relevant property (in this case, being racialied black).  
Lippert-Rasmussen suggests that, in the case of direct discrimination: 
 
X treats Y worse than Z by ĭ-ing because (X believes that) Y has P and (X believes that) Z 
does not have P if, and only if, the thought that Y, and not Z, has P is part of X's direct, 
motivating reason for ĭ-ing.11 
 
This is intended to capture the relation that holds between (perceived or imagined) membership of a 
socially salient group and disadvantageous treatment as we find it in cases of direct discrimination.
 This characterization seems to serve well in cases of discrimination in which explicit bias 
has a role; that is, in which someone's perceived group membership considered by the agent to be a 
reason for treating them disadvantageously. Such cases of explicit bias include, for example, if an 
individual is believed to be less suitable for a job - represented as incompetent - because of beliefs 
about race and competence, or judged less likely to be an effective leader - represented as indecisive 
- because of beliefs about gender and leadership.  
Cases of implicit bias discrimination seem not to involve such clear beliefs or judgments 
that are taken to justify differential treatment. Yet we should expect discrimination due to implicit 
bias to be captured by an analysis of direct discrimination:12 it is a matter of an individual treating 
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another individual disadvantageously on account of her race (or gender, or age etc.). But in fact, 
whether the analysis offered can capture these cases of discrimination will depend on exactly how 
condition iii is glossed, and in particular on how we understand the notion of a µPRWLYDWLQJ reasRQ¶ 
for action. On one broad rendering of this notion, we might follow a Williams-inspired 
understanding of motivating reason, which is to say that an agent has a motivating reason for some 
action ĳ-ing) when she µKDV some motive which will be served or furthered by [her] ĳ-LQJ´ (1981: 
101). On this reading of what it is to have a motivating reason, we commit only to the idea that the 
agent has some motive that causes her to act. She need not be aware of this motive, or the role it 
plays in her action; indeed, she may disavow it. Thus construed, the shooter bias case could be 
understood such that the fact that the individual is racialized black does serve as a motivating 
reason for the SDUWLFLSDQW¶V differential (worse) treatment ± even though the participant is unaware 
of this motive and its role in her action. Note we must also suppose, on this reading, that µWKH 
thought WKDW¶ the individual is racialized black must also be construed permissively: as including 
unconscious thoughts, as well as explicitly entertained reflections. 
Whilst this interpretation of Lippert-5DVPXVVHQ¶V understanding - of what it is to treat 
someone differently µEHFDXVH¶ of her perceived group membership - can accommodate cases of 
discrimination due to implicit bias, there is perhaps something inelegant or unsatisfying about it. In 
particular, it seems to require some specification of the motive that is furthered by the DJHQW¶V 
discriminatory action. There may be answers to be given here ± vested and unarticulated or 
disavowed interests in preserving racial hierarchy (for racialized white participants, at least); or 
perhaps more simply an interest in efficient cognizing, which promulgates dependency on such fast 
associative thought. But we will need an answer (or answers) that cover all of the cases in which 
discrimination due to implicit bias is found, and that is not an ad hoc postulate to ensure the agent 
comes out as having the requisite motivating reason(s). Perhaps there is work to do in pinning this 
part of the analysis down so that apprehension of the individuals group membership is the cause - 
the motivating reason - for the differential treatment. 
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Note that there are some interpretations of 'motivating UHDVRQV¶ that will not be compatible 
with Lippert-Rasmussen's analysis. For example, on another rendering of the notion, a motivating 
reason is µD reason for which someone does something, a reason that, in the DJHQW¶V eyes, counts in 
favor of her acting in a certain ZD\¶ (Alvarez, 2016).13 But note that on this latter reading, in many 
cases of discrimination due to implicit bias, 'the thought that Y has P' (e.g. the individual is black) 
cannot properly be construed as the agent's 'motivating reason' for action. This is because in many 
cases, the agent who is influenced by implicit bias disavows the associations (or associated 
propositions) that are implicated in the discriminatory actions. For example, in the shooter bias 
case, individuals who display this discriminatory pattern of shooting may nonetheless deny that µWKH 
thought that the individual is EODFN¶ counts in favor of her acting a certain way. On explicit self-
reports, the agent may strongly resist subscribing to propositions such as µEODFN people are more 
likely to carry ZHDSRQV¶ and repudiate any such racist stereotypes. That the individual is black does 
not provide the agent with a motivating reason for differential treatment, then. Of course, we might 
uncharitably take such self-reports as disingenuous and insincere. But a further reason for 
maintaining that this cannot be posited as the DJHQW¶V motivating reason is that, in the case of 
implicit bias, individuals may not intend to discriminate, and indeed may not be aware that they 
have been implicated in differential treatment. 
The upshot of this is that the gloss on motivating reasons needs to be spelled out in more 
detail. If one spells it out in terms of the broader reading ± the motive for or cause of the DJHQW¶V 
action ± then implicit bias discrimination may be captured by condition iii. However, if for 
independent reasons one endorses the narrower construal of motivating reasons, a different 
articulation of condition iii will be needed in order to capture the phenomena of discrimination that 
results from implicit bias. In these cases, what is needed is a more direct connection between the 
socially salient group membership and the differential treatment; one that is not mediated by the 
DJHQW¶V thoughts about her reasons for action. Various options are available. For example, we might 
say that: 
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X treats Y worse than Z by ĭ-ing because (X believes that) Y has P and (X believes that) Z 
does not have P if, and only if, 1) the thought that Y, and not Z, has P is part of X's direct, 
motivating reason for ĭ-ing, or 2) ;¶V categorisation of Y, and not Z, as P influences her 
ĭ-ing. 
 
Whilst 1) continues to deal with the cases where discrimination is intentional and based on explicit 
prejudice, this additional clause, 2), should capture cases where the DJHQW¶V automatic processing of 
social identity, and automatically activated stereotypes or affective states, influence the DJHQW¶V 
behavior without her awareness, and without her intention. The mere (and perhaps non conscious or 
subpersonal) categorization of the individual as belonging to a socially salient group may suffice to 
activate the automatic processes that influence the DJHQW¶V behavior.  
This might seem excessively complicated. An alternative fix would be to appeal to a 
contrast class that is on the table with talk of motivating reasons: namely, explanatory reasons. An 
explanatory reason is one that explains an DJHQW¶V action, and it certainly seems clear that we should 
want to appeal to social category information (that the individual was racialized black) to explain 
the DJHQW¶V differential treatment. This would lead us to the following specification of condition iii: 
 
X treats Y worse than Z by ĭ-ing because (X believes that) Y has P and (X believes that) Z 
does not have P if, and only if, Y having (or being believed to have) P, and not Z, is the 
explanatory reason for ;¶V ĭ-ing. 
 
This is certainly a more elegant fix. However, one reason to worry about this way of capturing 
implicit bias discrimination is that we may then lose the distinction between direct and indirect 
discrimination. This is because in cases of indirect discrimination, the fact (for example) the agent 
is racialized black will also explain the differential treatment, but indirectly, via the proxy 
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consideration that ends up yielding racial discrimination. To accommodate this, one could restrict 
explanatory reasons to those which are psychological: namely, those which feature in the agent's 
psychology, rather than those which have any explanatory role. Since (I assume) we should want to 
maintain the distinction between direct and indirect discrimination, and see discrimination due to 
implicit bias falling on the direct discrimination side of the distinction, this fix will have to be 
understood in this way to do the work required. 
There may be further reasons to object to these modified conditions, or to favor one over the 
other. The main concern here, though, is to demonstrate that attention to the research in social 
psychology has import for analyses of discrimination. If these analyses seek to capture such 
phenomena as discrimination due to implicit bias, then some revisions - of the sort proposed above - 
may be in order. 
 
4. Stereotype threat 
A third domain of research in social psychology that is worth turning our attention to concerns the 
phenomena known as µVWHUHRW\SH WKUHDW¶ As detailed by Steele (1997, 2010), µVWHUHRW\SH WKUHDW¶ 
refers to the cases in which the perceived threat of confirming a stereotype has a deleterious effect 
on an LQGLYLGXDO¶V performance on a task. 
 For example, Steele and Aronson (1995) asked black and white college students to take a 
study comprised of questions from the GRE (Graduate Record Examination). Some of the 
participants were told the test was diagnostic of intellectual ability, whilst others were explicitly 
told it was not diagnostic of abilities. The diagnostic condition activated stereotypes about the lower 
intellectual abilities of black people. In this condition, black students underperformed compared to 
the white students; no such effect was found in the non-diagnostic condition. Shih et al (1999) 
found that stereotypes about gender had a similar effect: when gender - and the perceived threat of 
the stereotype that women are poor at math - was made salient, women VWXGHQWV¶ performances 
suffered. Interestingly, this effect disappeared when another aspect of the ZRPHQ¶V identities were 
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made salient, namely, their Asian-American identity, which is stereotyped as skilled at quantitative 
reasoning.  
 These studies, and others, are taken to support a variety of hypotheses about the mechanism 
by which perceived stereotype hinders performance. Candidate explanations contend that the 
activation of a stereotype, and an LQGLYLGXDOV¶ awareness of this stereotype - even if they do not 
endorse it - may provoke anxiety. Alternatively, such awareness may decrease motivation on the 
task; or cause subjects to unintentionally imitate and express the stereotype in their engagement 
with the task; or simply create self-doubt which distracts from the task in hand.14 
 The phenomenon of stereotype threat raises some interesting questions for proposed 
analyses of discrimination. In particular, we may press for greater precision with respect to our 
understanding of what it is to µWUHDW¶ an individual X worse than Y - the framing that appears in 
condition ii) of the analysis above (section 1). Does the sort of behavior that is described as 
µDFWLYDWLQJ a VWHUHRW\SH¶ in the context of these studies, constitute a form of differential (worse) 
treatment? In some cases this µDFWLYDWLRQ¶ amounted to no more than merely mentioning gender, or 
the mere mention of some feature of the task associated with a stereotype - for example, whether a 
test is diagnostic of intellectual abilities. Steele and Aronson (1995) simply told their participants 
(black and white) in the diagnostic condition that: 
 
 µEHFDXVH we want an accurate measure of your ability in these domains, we want to ask  
 you to try as hard as you can to perform well on these tasks. At the end of this study, we  
 can give you feedback which may be helpful by pointing out your strengths and   
 ZHDNQHVVHV¶ (803).  
 
It is rather surprising to consider this prompt as a form of differential and disadvantageous 
treatment that partially constitutes discrimination. This will be especially so in cases in which the 
individual is not at all aware that such words activate stereotypes that can have a deleterious effect 
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on performance. Nonetheless, it is true that this mere mention did, under some description, involve 
treating individuals involved in the study differently and disadvantageously. For black students, this 
constituted activating a negative stereotype - since this prompt sufficed to activate negative 
stereotypes concerning black people and intellectual abilities, and thereby caused (via one or other 
of the candidate mechanisms mentioned above) lower levels of performance. For the white students 
who were given this very same prompt, no negative stereotype was activated. 
 Should we capture such behaviors, which (perhaps unknowingly) activate stereotypes, as 
directly discriminatory treatment? How one might unpack the notion of µWUHDWPHQW¶ will depend on 
whether one is inclined to subsume the phenomenon of stereotype threat under the rubric of direct  - 
rather than indirect - discrimination. It seems unclear to me what intuition or ordinary usage 
supports, and broader theoretical concerns might guide RQH¶V choice here. However one chooses, 
there is some work to do. If one is so inclined to see stereotype threat as a form of direct 
discrimination, then a notion of µWUHDWPHQW¶ that can handle the various and subtle ways of 
activating stereotypes will be needed. On the other hand, one may not want to extend the analysis of 
direct discrimination to include stereotype threat. On this line of thought, we could leave such cases 
to be captured by the analysis of indirect discrimination.15 Then an understanding of µWUHDWPHQW¶ 
should be developed, as part of the analysis of direct discrimination that excludes such activation. 
This might be a delicate matter, however, since manifestly, we have reason to maintain that treating 
(in the standard common-sense way) according to stereotypes is a form of discrimination (cf. 
Lippert-Rasmussen at p.21). Yet, we have seen that direct discrimination need not be intentional 
(section 4 above; see also Lippert-Rasmussen fn 70). So, circumscribing the notion of µWUHDWLQJ¶ in a 
way that maps these complex contours, and allows us to allocate stereotype threat to the desired 
side of the direct/indirect distinction, may be a demanding task. 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
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We have seen three domains of research from social psychology, concerning in-group favoritism; 
implicit bias, and stereotype threat. Each poses distinctive challenges to philosophical analyses of 
discrimination: the first concerns how we might characterize the µVRFLDO VDOLHQFH¶ of group 
membership on the basis of which one is disadvantageously treated, and whether this should include 
all cases of in-group favoritism, or only those that track groups that have widespread social 
salience. The second concerns how the basis for a GLVFULPLQDWRU¶V differential treatment is 
understood, and whether it need make reference to the explicit beliefs of the discriminator, or 
include mere automatic categorizations that instigate implicit biases. Finally, we saw that some 
refinements may be needed to what is included within the scope of differential treatment, and 
whether it includes seemingly innocuous behavior that nonetheless activates stereotypes, and 
thereby stereotype threat. Whilst these matters are philosophical, and cannot be settled simply by 
appeal to empirical research, my hope is that these observations provide further motivation for 
philosophers interested in discrimination to mine the rich seams of research on the social 
psychology of discrimination.16 
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1
 Note that whilst these conditions capture the sorts of treatment that we find morally objectionable, 
no moral evaluation is built into the conditions themselves: it is thus a contingent empirical fact that 
these conditions pick out treatment that is often morally objectionable - often in a way that makes it 
wrong - when they do. (Lippert-Rasmussen's later analysis of the wrong as to do with the harm that 
discrimination imposes fills out that part of the account - see chapter 6 of his 2013). 
 22 
                                                                                                                                                                  
2
 However, for a more complex pattern of results, see Hewstone & Ward (1985), who focused on 
Malay/Chinese identities; and Stephan (1977) which examined attributions of anglo- Chicano- and 
black American high school students. All these studies are discussed in the overview by Hewstone 
1990.  
3
  Also worth noting is that in-group favoritism need not coincide with antipathy towards an out-
group (Brewer 1999; see also Ramiah el at 2010 p.88).  
4
 Compare also %DEHU¶V notion of social salience, which focuses on the extent to which a property is 
taken to µSUHGLFW and explain beliefs, character traits, tastes or other socially significant 
psychological FKDUDFWHULVWLFV¶ (2001: p.53). This characterization will also exclude from salient 
those arbitrary and artificial in-group statuses, insofar as whether one is (e.g.) an under or over-
estimator is clearly not taken to predict or explain much at all.   
5
 Contention abounds as to how to characterize these automatic thought processes ± whether they 
involve associative mental states, states with propositional content, affective or representational 
content, and whether they are mental states at all. For discussion see Mandelbaum 2015, Levy 2015, 
Machery 2016, Holroyd 2016. 
6
 Downloadable here: http://www.aauw.org/resource/barriers-and-bias/ 
7
 There is contention over the predictive validity of implicit biases: see discussion in Machery 2016, 
and Oswald et al 2013. The important point to take away from the research, it seems, is that biases 
may lead to discriminatory behavior, though it is difficult to determine when this is so. Given this, 
we cannot be confident that our behavior is not influenced in these discriminatory ways. For debate 
about these concerns regarding predictive validity, see the roundtable discussion at The Brains 
Blog: http://philosophyofbrains.com/2017/01/17/how-can-we-measure-implicit-bias-a-brains-blog-
roundtable.aspx 
8
 See discussion from Christopher LeBron (2016) of the wide reaching impact of shootings of black 
males, by police, on the lives of all racialized as black. Of course, we need not believe all such 
cases are due to implicit bias. 
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9
 This is slightly complicated by the fact that we are talking about a fictional individual, portrayed 
in the study images. However, I do not take this complication to affect the substantive point at issue 
here: that such discriminatory behavior cannot be captured by the conditions as stated. 
10
  Of course, the study is alarming insofar as it indicates that such behavioral propensities might be 
found outside of laboratory simulations. As such, we might cautiously say that such studies are 
evidence of discrimination outside the lab, rather than acts of discrimination themselves. But my 
point is not that the laboratory setting cannot be accommodated by this set of conditions. The point 
is that the analysis cannot as it stands capture differential treatment that results from such biases.  
11
 Note that Lippert-Rasmussen appears to endorse this condition as an analysis of direct 
discrimination (37), but rejects it as an analysis of discrimination tout court, since indirect 
discrimination cannot be accommodated by this analysis. The final and full articulation of this 
condition for group discrimination is disjunctive, whereby: µ; treats Y worse than Z by ĭ-ing 
because (X believes that) Y has P and (X believes that) Z does not have P if, and only if, (i) the 
thought that Y, and not Z, has P is part of X's direct, motivating reason for ĭ-ing, or (ii) the fact that 
Y, and not Z, has P causally explains ;¶V ĭ-ing and this in turn is causally explained by the fact 
that people with P are often treated worse than those without P in the sense given by L¶ (38). The 
second disjunct here is supposed to capture the phenomena of indirect discrimination. However, I 
take it for our purposes, our attention should be on the first disjunct (i) since discrimination due to 
implicit bias should be captured by an analysis of direct, rather than indirect discrimination. 
12
 Note that in some cases, implicit bias is revealed across groups of individuals. For example, 
consider studies, such as the CV studies mentioned above, where the structure is a µEHWZHHQ 
SDUWLFLSDQWV¶ study, such that no participant makes judgements about or interacts with both black 
and white individuals, and differential treatment emerges in patterns of behavior across participants 
- some of whom interact with or make evaluations about black individuals, others of whom interact 
with or make evaluations of white individuals. In such cases, our understanding of discrimination 
due to implicit bias may pose additional difficulties for this model of direct discrimination. The 
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analysis will perhaps only hold on the assumption that, in these µEHWZHHQ SDUWLFLSDQWV¶ studies, each 
individual would have judged differently were the race of the applicant different. My remarks in the 
text above apply to cases where implicit bias is revealed by differential treatment, by one person, of 
individuals differentially racialized.  
13
 See also 'DQF\¶V view of motivating reasons, whereby for something to be a motivating reason 
for the agent, she has to take that consideration to be a normative reason for acting (Dancy 2000). 
This construal of motivating reasons similarly seems to require that the consideration µLQ the DJHQW¶V 
H\HV¶ is a reason for ± a consideration in favor of - action. 
14
 For an overview of a range of studies on stereotype threat, and an evaluation of the competing 
hypotheses, see Mallon 2016.  
15
 For the statement of the analysis of indirect discrimination, see footnote 11. The key difference is 
the focus on the causal role of social category information, rather than the role it plays in the 
psychological dispositions of the individual who disadvantageously treats another. 
16
 This research was completed with the support of the Leverhulme Trust project grant on Bias and 
Blame (RPG-2013-326). 
